The man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack is a cyber attack in which an attacker intercepts traffic, thus harming the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the network. It remains a popular attack vector due to its simplicity. However, existing solutions are either not portable, suffer from a high false positive rate, or simply not generic. In this paper, we propose Vesper: a novel plug-and-play MitM detector for local area networks. Vesper uses a technique inspired from impulse response analysis used in the domain of acoustic signal processing. Analogous to how echoes in a cave capture the shape and construction of the environment, so to can a short and intense pulse of ICMP echo requests model the link between two network hosts. Vesper uses neural networks called autoencoders to model the normal patterns of the echoed pulses and detect when the environment changes. Using this technique, Vesper is able to detect MitM attacks with high accuracy while incurring minimal network overhead. We evaluate Vesper on LANs consisting of video surveillance cameras, servers, and PC workstations. We also investigate several possible adversarial attacks against Vesper and demonstrate how Vesper mitigates these attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE attack (MitM) is where a malicious third party takes control of a communication channel between two or more endpoints by intercepting and forwarding the traffic in transit. An attacker in the middle has the capability of harming the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the user's content, by eavesdropping, manipulating, crafting, and dropping traffic on the network. In general, the MitM attack model on a local area network (LAN) has three steps: (1) gain access to the network, (2) intercept traffic in transit, and (3) manipulate, craft, or drop traffic.
Depending on the scenario, access can be achieved by connecting to a public Wi-Fi access point (e.g. at a café, airport...) or by connecting physically to an exposed network cable or network switch. The attacker can also conduct this attack remotely via a malware which has infected a trusted computer within the existing network [1] . After gaining access, interception can be achieved by exploiting known Manuscript The authors are with the Department of Software and Information Systems Engineering, Ben-Gurion University, Beersheba 8410501, Israel (e-mail: yisroel@post.bgu.ac.il; kalbo@post.bgu.ac.il; elovici@bgu.ac.il; shabtaia@bgu.ac.il).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS. 2018.2883177 vulnerabilities in network protocols. For example, the attacker can poison a host's address resolution protocol (ARP) table to capture local traffic [2] - [4] , or spoofing a domain name server (DNS) to intercept all web traffic [5] - [7] . The attacker can easily exploit these vulnerabilities with free tools which work out-of-the-box such as Ettercap, Cain and Abel, Evilgrade, arpspoof, dsniff, and many others. Although MitM attacks on LANs have been known for some time, they are still considered a significant threat [8] , [9] , and have gained academic attention over the years. This is likely because the attack is relatively easy to achieve, yet challenging to detect [10] . Encryption can protect the integrity and confidentiality of the traffic in transit. However, according to [11] , 30% of the world's web traffic is not encrypted. Furthermore, in many cases networked systems do not encrypt their traffic by default (e.g., SCADA control system [12] ). Moreover, even if the traffic is encrypted, encryption protocols may have flaws [13] , [14] , be misconfigured, or simply left out by a manufacturer (e.g. CVE-2017-15643) . We also note that LAN-based MitM attacks are used in APTs to achieve lateral movement [15] . Therefore, there is a need for detecting the presence of a MitM, even when encryption is employed.
A. The Proposed Solution
Our proposed solution is inspired by signal processing domain. In a dynamic system, the output (reaction) of the system to a short input signal is called impulse response. A common use of impulse responses is the modeling and recreation of acoustic environments, such as small rooms or concert halls. As an intuitive example, one can hear the IR of a room by clapping their hands. The sound of the clap changes based on the size, shape, and materials of the room.
Using this concept, we propose a MitM detector called Vesper. Vesper bats are the largest and best-known family of the bat species. Akin to it name, our detector captures the impulse response of a LAN by measuring the roundtrip-times (RTT) resulting from an intense burst of ICMP echo requests. The payload sizes of the ICMP request packets are modulated according to an excitation signal. As a result, the impulse response extracted from the RTTs can be used to model the network environment in the perspective of two communicating hosts. When a third party intercepts traffic, the harmonic composition of the impulse response between the hosts changes significantly. These changes can be detected using an anomaly detector.
The described impulse response analysis is enough to detect all LAN based MitM attacks. However, although the described echo analysis seems difficult to evade, there are several adversarial attacks which can be performed. For example, Eve can spoof the ICMP replies on behalf of the victim or even replay previously recorded bursts. Therefore, Vesper monitors three features in total to resist adversarial attacks: the impulse response's energy, the overall delay, and the packets' jitter distribution. The three features are weak at detecting some adversarial attacks, but strong at detecting others. Therefore, when combined, these features provide good protection against adversarial attacks.
Altogether, Vesper (1) probes a link with an end-host with a modulated ICMP excitation signal, (2) extracts three features from the response, and (3) detects MitM attacks and potential adversarial attacks using an autoencoder neural network as an anomaly detector. In this paper, we show how Vesper works with various devices, in the presence of diverse traffic, across multiple switches, and for long durations of time. We also show how Vesper is robust against adversarial attacks, and can differentiate between devices with identical hardware.
B. Contributions
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are as follows.
• A novel method for detecting the presence of a MitM attack on a LAN via echo-analysis. The method is nonintrusive (no packet inspection), incurs a minimal overhead on the network, and is not dependent of the hardware and software of the LAN or the attacker's device. • A framework for deploying the technique on a LAN (Vesper). The framework is plug-and-play, which makes the detection method practical. The framework has been designed to resist an evasive adversary. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In sections II and III, we present the MitM attack model and related works respectively. In section IV, we provide a background on echo analysis, and introduce our technique (ping echo analysis).
In section V, we present the framework for MitM detection in LANs via ping echo analysis (Vesper). In section VI, we present evaluations of Vesper on several different networks. In section VII, we present possible adversarial attacks against Vesper and the respective countermeasures. Finally, in section VIII, we conclude our paper.
II. THE ATTACK MODEL
In this section we describe the MitM attack model used throughout the paper. We also enumerate the attacker's requirements, attack vectors, and capabilities.
A. Attack Scenario
Let Alice and Bob be victims located on the same LAN segment, where the LAN segment may contain one or more network switches. Let Eve be the attacker whose objective is to perform a MitM attack between Alice and Bob. In other words, Eve wants to manipulate the traffic sent between Alice and Bob, while being able to craft new traffic as well (e.g., sending ARP packets). Eve has physical access to the LAN's infrastructure, and can install malware on a network host other than Alice and Bob.
B. Attack Topologies
Eve can accomplish her objective by establishing one of the following MitM topologies (illustrated in Fig. 1 ): End-Point (EP) MitM. Eve either adds a new host, or compromises an existing host on the LAN. Eve then causes the traffic in transit between the Alice and Bob to flow through her device (e.g., via ARP poisoning or some other protocol-based MitM attack). In-Line (IL) MitM. Eve locates an exposed network cable which Alice and Bob use to communicate. Eve then covertly installs a device which passes all traffic from one side of the wire to the other, while being able to manipulate/inject traffic. In-Point (IP) MitM. Eve locates an exposed network switch which Alice and Bob use to communicate. Eve then swaps the switch with a new switch that has additional logic enabling her to manipulate/inject traffic. Unlike the EP MitM, IL and IP MitM attacks can only be accomplished by introducing additional hardware. Therefore, these attacks require physical access to the LAN.
C. Classes of Attacks
MitM attacks in a LAN vary based on their stealth and complexity. For example, a more covert attack is typically more difficult for the attacker to accomplish. We categorize the class of a MitM attack based on the MitM topology, and implementation used. Table I summarizes these classes, and their notations which we use throughout the paper.
We note that although an In-Point Dedicated Hardware (IP-DH) MitM attack is very hard to detect, it is also very hard for the attacker to accomplish. This is because (1) network switches are typically stored under lock and key, and (2) modern switches provide a password protected administrator console (the attacker must copy the configurations prior to the swap).
There are two reasons why such a MitM will buffer each and every inbound packet: (1) to avoid signal collisions on the media when transmitting crafted/altered packets, and (2) to capture and alter relevant packets before they reach their intended destination. In the latter case, the MitM must parse every frame in order to determine the frame's relevancy to the attack, and cannot retroactively stop a transmitted frame. Therefore, the interception process (hardware and/or software) will affect the timing of network traffic. We note that since passive wiretaps only observe traffic, they are not MitM attacks and therefore not in the scope of this paper. However, Vesper can detect a MitM which is presently eavesdropping (not currently altering traffic) because a MitM always buffers each packet upon reception. Fig. 2 illustrates the basic packet interception process for all MitM implementations.
III. RELATED WORKS
In our review of related works, we will focus on MitM attacks which the target communication channels [9] , and we will also only focus on solutions which are concerned with the data link layer of the OSI model.
In the past decade, many different detection schemes have been proposed in order to address MitM attacks. In general, the solutions to MitM attacks on LANs address a specific flaw in a protocol [3] , [5] , [6] , [16] , [17] . As an example, consider the infamous vulnerability in the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP). The vulnerability gives untrusted hosts the ability to spread spoofed ARP messages, causing network traffic to be routed to the attacker's device. Solutions to this flaw include improved protocols [2] , [18] , [19] and the integration of new security features [20] .
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been proposed as a more generic way for dealing with MitM attacks. These IDSs include software-based IDSs [21] and hybrid hardware/software IDSs (e.g., an add-on component plugged into the mirror port of a switch) [10] .
However, these solutions have limitations: Generalization. Many of these solutions address a flaw in a specific protocol, and therefore cannot be generalized to other or unknown MitM attacks occurring in the LAN. For example, detecting an exploitation of the ARP protocol does not solve the issue of an IL MitM.
Portability. Some of these solutions require additional hardware or other costly resources. For example, a separate network host which acts as an IDS. False Positives. Network traffic tends to be noisy, making it difficult to detect the presence of a MitM based on traffic patterns and packet contents. Therefore, searching network packets for evidence of a MitM may lead to a large number of false positives [10] . Regardless, all of the related solutions are weak to IL MitM attacks, since they leave no forensic evidence in the packets. On the other hand, Vesper does not require additional hardware and can detect EP, IL, and IP MitM attacks. Furthermore, Vesper is robust since it analyzes its own probes and not the traffic of others.
Trabelsi et al. [22] propose a method for detecting when an end-user's Network Interface Card (NIC) has been changed to promiscuous mode (e.g., sniffing via Wireshark). They accomplish this by creating an RTT dataset for each host in the network, categorized by the host's operating system. Each dataset contains the average, standard deviation, and ratio between the statstics with and without the sniffer active on the end-point. The authors then use z-statistics over these datasets to determine if a host has activated a sniffer.
Our work differs from [22] in the following ways:
1) The technique in [22] detects hosts operating in promiscuous mode, but not necessarily acting as a MitM.
2) The solution in [22] requires the network administrator to manually collect a data set from each device in his/her network; with and without promiscuous mode on. Our technique is transparent, and provides a fully unsupervised plug-and-play solution.
3) The solution in [22] is weak against replay attacks, where the MitM responds to the ICMP requests according to the expected RTT times. Our solution is robust against these attacks because we utilize features extracted from randomized signals -thus preventing the attacker from replaying a pre-recorded probe (a timed sequence of ICMP echo replies). Finally, one can use cable fault detection [23] in order to detect when and where a cable has been cut or altered (e.g., connected to a wiretap). However, implementing this approach requires additional hardware, whereas Vesper is implemented as software. Moreover, this approach is applied per physical wire. This means that every interface and switch in the network would need to implement the technology. On the other hand, Vesper is only implemented on the endpoints. Finally, the approach cannot be used to detect EP-TD attacks and some IL attacks. This is because in these attacks the physical links of the LAN are not altered. In contrast, Vesper fingerprints every device along an end-to-end link in the LAN, and therefore will detect these attacks.
IV. ECHO ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the probing technique used by Vesper to capture the presence of a MitM. Later in section V, we show how Vesper uses this technique to actively detect MitM attacks.
A. Notations and Definitions
In order describe our technique, we now briefly present some common notations and definitions from the domain of signal processing [24] . Signal. A signal, in this paper, is a discreet sequence of values sampled at the rate f s (measured in units of Hz 
B. Acoustic Signal Processing
Our technique is inspired by the domain of acoustic signal processing. Therefore, we will now briefly cover this topic to give the reader a better understanding of our technique.
In the domain of acoustic signal processing, a sound which reverberates through the air, and the environment (e.g., room) which reflects and affects the vibrations as they propagate, are the signal x and LTI system S respectively. An acoustic engineer can model S by extracting its impulse response h. This can be achieved by emitting an excitation signal x at one location while simultaneously recording the resulting signal y at another location. In this case, the input to S is generated by a speaker and the output is captured by a microphone.
There are several methods for extracting an acoustic impulse response with an excitation signal. These methods can be categorized as either being direct or indirect (visualized in Fig. 3 
): Direct Methods. Direct methods involve an excitation signal
x which is similar to that of a Dirac function, so that y = h. However, since it is impossible to generate a true Dirac signal in an acoustic environment, short loud sounds are used instead. For example, popping a balloon, generating a spark, and firing a gun. Indirect Methods. An approximation of h can be obtained indirectly from a non-Dirac excitation signal. The process involves deconvolving the excitation signal x with the resulting output signal y [24] . One well-known excitation signal is the maximal length sequence (MLS) signal. An MLS is a pseudorandom binary sequence generated from maximal linear feedback shift registers. With m registers, the generator produces a random binary sequence of length N = 2 m − 1 which is spectrally flat. As a result, an MLS excitation signal produces all frequencies, closely resembles white noise, and is robust in noisy and populated environments [25] . A code snippet is available in this paper's the supplementary material, and the reader may download our MLS generator's source code and demo online. 1 Once the impulse response h has been extracted from S, it can be used to perform a convolution reverb (a digital simulation of an audio environment on sound). For example, the response can be used to make a recorded piece of music to sound like it was played in a particular cave or arena. We can see from this that h is dependent on the shape of the room, the materials of the surfaces, and the positioning of the speaker and microphone. Any alteration to these physical parameters will cause a noticeable affect on the impulse response. In other words, an impulse response can be seen as an acoustical signature of the environment.
To illustrate this concept, Fig. 4 presents two impulse responses extracted from different environments. The initial Dirac pulse (e.g., balloon pop sound) can be seen at the beginning, followed by dynamic reverberations and echoes (i.e., spikes). The figure shows that each environment has its own unique signature due to their unique constructs.
C. Ping Signal Processing
Our approach to MitM detection is to (1) model a LAN as an acoustic environment, (2) emit excitation signals, (3) model the echoed response signals, and (4) detect abnormal changes in newly sampled responses.
In networks, there are no reverberations of sound waves. However, switches, network interfaces, and operating systems all affect a packet's travel time across a network. The hardware, buffers, caches, and even the software versions of the devices which interact with the packets, all affect packet timing. When a device processes a burst of packets, the device has dynamic reaction with respect to the packets' sizes. This affects the packets' processing times, which are in turn, then propagated to the next node in the network. This is analogous to how a sound wave is affected as it reverberates off various surfaces.
To capture packet timing between a local host and an end-host, one can use the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) [26] . The ICMP is a popular protocol used to gain feedback about problems in an IP network. One of the features of this protocol is the Echo_Request command, commonly used to determine whether a host is operational. When a host sends another host an Echo_Request, the target host returns an ICMP Echo_Reply. Upon receiving the Echo_Reply, the sender can measure the round-trip-time (RTT) to and from the receiver. This process is referred to as 'pinging'. To according to the ICMP standard (RFC 1122: 3.2.2.6), one may include data (a payload) in an Echo_Request. In this case, the receiver must include the same data in the Echo_Reply.
The RTT of an ICMP packet over a LAN is dependent on the number of switches (hops) traversed, since interactive networking elements (e.g., switches) must fully buffer each received frame before transmitting. The RTT is also dependent on the current load and the hardware/software implementation of each networking element along the path of the ping. With this in mind, we present our RTT model (illustrated in Fig. 5 
):
Let h i (t) denote the time it takes to transfer an Ethernet frame between the two network elements at the i -th hop at time t. Assuming the frame is B bytes long, we model it as
where pr op is the propagation time on the wire (approx. the speed of light), trans is the transmission time for a single byte, and pr oc i (t) is the average processing time per byte at the transmitting element at time t (e.g., parsing and buffering). For simplicity, we will assume that all switches in the LAN are identical. As a result, using (1) we can model the trip time (TT) from host i to host j as
Finally, we can use (2) to model the RTT between host i and host j , sent at time t, as
where reply j (t) is the average time it takes for host j to process each byte in an ICMP echo reply, at time t.
With the assistance of the model in (3), we will now define our system and its signals.
1) System Definition (S): Let S be a LAN environment consisting of one or more switches and numerous hosts. Let S i j be the LAN in the perspective of host i communicating with host j , where i and j are within the same LAN.
Let g be our generator signal which produces our system's input signal x. The signal g is defined as a sequence of ICMP Echo_Request frames transmitted at a rate of f s Hz, where g[n] ∈ {42, 43, . . . , 1542} are the number of bytes which are transmitted in the ICMP Echo_Request: 42 bytes for the Ethernet, IPv4, and ICMP protocol headers, plus an additional 0-1500 bytes for the ICMP payload).
Let the input signal x be defined as the packet transmission times as a result of g. More formally,
Finally, let the output signal y be defined as the sequence of RTTs, computed from the respective ICMP Echo_Reply packets' arrival times. More formally,
where T t x [n] is the transmission timestamp of the n-th Echo_Request in x, and T r x [n] is the reception time of the resulting Echo_Reply. Based on (3), it is clear that there is a direct relationship between the packet transmission times x and the RTTs y as generated by the signal g (evident in Fig. 6 ).
2) Ping Excitation Signal (x): In order to capture a characterization of S i j , we use an MLS excitation signal as the generator signal g.
To transmit a binary MLS signal s, we modulate is over g as the minimum and maximum ICMP payload sizes. For example, one possible N = 7 length MLS may be s = {1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0}. In this case, s would be translated into the transmission signal g = {1542, 1542, 1542, 42, 1542, 42, 42}. Fig. 6 illustrates an m = 10 bit (N = 1023 length) sequence (g) modulated as the input signal x, and then received as the output signal y.
There are several reasons why we use the MLS method over other known excitation methods:
• The MLS method is known to be robust in noisy environments, such as a room populated with conversing individuals [25] . Network traffic can affect S i j , thus it is appropriate to assume the system will be noisy. • An MLS of sufficient length has subsequences of '1's.
This results in bursts of pings which have the maximum size of 1500. This burst causes a momentary stress on the network which is reflected in the output y, thus better capturing the network's characteristics. • An MLS is randomly generated each time, thus raising the difficulty for an attacker to perform a replay attack (discussed in detail later in section VII). When the random sized packets of the modulated MLS signal g are sent back-to-back at a fast rate, the electronics, caching mechanisms, CPU schedulers, and queuing algorithms of each network element dynamically affect the respective pr oc(t) and reply(t) in response to the varying load. Since the transmission times x of the payloads in g reflect an MLS signal, y captures S i j 's fingerprint (impulse response).
Empirical evidence can be shown via linear regression. In brief, we found that the k-th RTT in y has a dependency on the random payload sizes of previously transmitted ICMP requests in x. More formally, y[k] ∼ x [1] , x [2] , . . . , x[k], with a p-value of less than 2e−16 for most of the descriptor variables. We also found that an 18% reduction in error can be achieved by considering x [1] , . . . , x[k] as the descriptor variables as opposed to just x [k] . In this experiment, the transmitter and receiver were separated by a 1Gbps switch. In Fig. 7 , we illustrate this dependency in the case of a direct host-to-host Ethernet connection. The figure shows the RTT distribution of the i -th ping sent in a burst of 50 pings, over 1500 trials. For example, the first box plot is the RTT distribution of the first ping sent in each of the 1500 bursts. If there were no dependency, then all of the distributions would have been the same. However, the figure shows that the system has a dynamic response to the burst of packets. Fig. 7 also shows that the first pings are noisier than those which follow (e.g., due to caching). This is another reason why we must send g at a fast rate, and not as individual pings. In our system, we set the transmission rate of g to
where μ RT T * denotes the average RTT time of largest ping possible (a 1542 byte Ethernet frame). This rate ensures that y captures the system well, while not overloading the end-host.
3) Echo Response Signal (y): The system's output y, from the excitation signal x, contains the impulse response h.
In order for h to fully characterize S i j , the system S i j must be LTI. In other words, S i j must be linear and time-invariant: a) Linearity: For S i j to be linear, it must hold that
for the scalar values a 1 and a 2 . By expanding the left side with (3), and by using (1) and (2), we find that
Since (9) where P[n] is the processing and reply times as a linear function based on the previous time indexes (n − 1 etc).
Finally, we zero out the first term because pr op ≈ 0 in a LAN, and substitute x[n] with the given parameter. This presents
In other words, the output y must be the same, regardless of when we transmit x. Since we sample the system locally over a very short interval of time, a snapshot of the network S i j can be described as time invariant. This is because during a short period of time, the state of the network remains relatively the same. Therefore, the system S i j is LTI. Furthermore, by sampling the distribution of S i j 's impulse responses over time, we can implicitly capture S i j 's characterization overall. Therefore, a collection of echo responses can be used to model S i j 's normal behavior (see section V-E).
4) ICMP Echo Response Jitter (z):
In order to form a robust MitM detector and to resist adversarial attacks, we also examine the jitter of the ICMP echo response signal. Jitter is the time lapse between two consecutive packet arrivals. We denote the jitter values of the ICMP echo responses as z, defined as
The bottom of Fig. 6 plots an example of the jitter resulting from the MLS signal x. In this example, we can see that the jitter is distributed at distinct high (650 usec), medium (390 usec), and low (50 usec) levels. The three distinct levels are the result of the transitions between adjacent bits in the MLS binary sequence. For instance, whenever a '10' appears in the sequence, the jitter is small. This is because the RTT of a 42 byte packet ('0') is shorter than that of a 1542 byte packet ('1'). Since the pings are sent at a rate of f s , the response for the '0' arrives shortly after the response for the '1'.
Although z is not part of our system model S i j , it captures additional characteristics of the channel between i and j . For example, additional processing delays and moments of stress on the participating network elements.
V. VESPER
In this section, we present the MitM detector Vesper: the framework, machine learning process, and deployment.
A. Overview
Vesper is a plug-and-play man-in-the-middle detector based on ping echo-analysis. The detector is installed on a local host within a LAN, and protects the local host from MitM attacks originating from within the same LAN. In this section, we use to denote the set of known remote hosts in the LAN, excluding the local host.
Vesper's framework has the following main components: It accomplishes this by profiling the link to each host j ∈ with an autoencoder. The autoencoder is trained to recognize the link's normal behavior. An autoencoder is a neural network which can be used as an anomaly detector (discussed later in section V-E). Vesper operates by performing the following steps (illustrated in Fig. 8 ):
We will now discuss the each of Vesper's main components in greater detail.
B. Orchestrator (OR)
Whenever a new IP address from the same subnet as Vesper is observed in the network traffic, or added by the user, the OR pings that address. If none of the pings traverse a router (indicated by TTL field of the IPv4 header) then the address is added to . After sending each probe, at a random time within the next second, the OR selects a random host i ∈ and initiates a probe via the LP.
C. Link Prober (LP)
After generating s and x, the LP transmits Echo_Request packets to the target host, according to x. The Echo_Request packets are transmitted every 1 f s = 1 2 μ RT T * seconds. This means that the transmission and reception of ICMP packets must be performed concurrently on two separate threads: the Excitation Emitter and Echo Receiver.
In order to measure the RTT of each ping correctly, each Echo_Request must be associated with its respective Echo_Reply. To accomplish this, the Excitation Emitter places the current index of x into the Sequence_Number field of the Echo_Request header. When a host replies, it copies the same value from the Echo_Request into the header of its Echo_Reply. The Identifier field is used to differentiate between separate excitation signals.
In order to obtain the necessary accuracy, the LP records all transmission and reception timestamps with nanosecond resolution. In C++, and with a Linux kernel, this can be accomplished using the <time.h> library's clock_gettime() with the CLOCK_MONOTONIC option enabled. 2 When the last Echo_Reply is received, y and z are computed, and the raw probe data (x, y, z) is passed to the FE for feature extraction.
D. Feature Extractor (FE)
After each probe, the FE is tasked with extracting the following three features from (x, y, z): The feature vector v = {v E h , v rtt * , v j it } summarizes the state of the probed channel (system S i j ). After the FE computes v, the vector is passed to the HP for inspection. Fig. 9 plots each of the features before and after a MitM attack.
1) Impulse Response Energy (v E h ):
When Eve intercepts Alice's traffic, Eve affects the dynamics of the channel between Alice and Bob. Even when Eve responds to Alice's ICMP traffic on behalf of Bob, the impulse response h, captured by y, changes. This is because Alice has different hardware and software than Bob. To exemplify this concept, Fig. 10 shows the average impulse response h obtained from x and y in the most extreme cases: when an intermediary switch is swapped with an identical switch (both D-Link DGS-1100), and when an end-host j ∈ is swapped with an identical device (both Raspberry Pi 3B). In both cases, h captures the variations and defects in the hardware of the swapped devices. Thus, h acts as a remote physically unclonable function (PUF) [27] which captures the state of the system S i j , where i is the local host.
The Impulse Extractor summarizes the state of the system S i j by measuring the energy of h, denoted E h . As mentioned in section IV-B, through a process called deconvolution, the response h can be obtained from the output y by knowing the excitation signal x.
In an LTI system, the output can be expressed as
where * is the convolution operator, and h is the system's impulse response. To extract impulse response in the absence of noise, we can perform the deconvolution
where F −1 is inverse of the Discreet Fourier Transform (DFT), and where Y and X are the Fourier Transforms of the signals y and x respectively. By assuming periodicity, we can use Parseval's theorem [24] to obtain E h without the need for computing the inverse DFT in (13) by computing
The resulting value used as the feature v E h in v. Fig. 1 , it can be seen that a both MitM attack scenarios add an additional 2 · T hop delay to Alice's traffic. We can detect this additional delay by averaging the values (RTTs) in y.
2) Mean RTT of the Largest Packets (v rtt * ): In
We note that the duration of T hop increases with the length of the Ethernet frame. Approximately 50% of the packets in x have the maximum length of 1542 bytes. By averaging the RTTs of those frames only, we obtain a better separation between benign the malicious scenarios. Fig. 11 illustrates the benefit of averaging the 1542 byte frames in each response y.
This average is extracted from each y by the DC Extractor, and used as the feature v RT T * in v.
3) Log-Likelihood of the Jitter's Distribution (v j it ):
As mentioned in section IV-C.4, the jitter of the Echo_Reply packets (z) captures the behavior of the networking elements between the sender and receiver. Concretely, since x is transmitted at a rate of f s , it can be expected that some packets may be being queued, and then transmitted back-to-back. This dynamic behavior characterizes the network's elements, and thus fingerprints the connection with host j . Fig. 12 plots z's distribution, with and without the presence of a MitM attack. Fig. 12 shows that the three levels of jitter (refer to section IV-C.4) are affected by the attack. To detect abnormalities in this distribution, the FE performs a twosample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. The KS test is a nonparametric statistical test which results in a probability value (p-value) that indicates how likely two sample distributions come from the same distribution. We denote this value as p X,Y , where X and Y are tested distributions.
The KS Tester stores m samples of host j 's jitter distributions. These samples are used as references for the channel's expected behavior. We denote host j 's references as the set Z j = z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z m . Although m is a parameter of V esper, in practice m = 5 works well.
Let z 0 denote the jitter distribution given to the FE for feature extraction. With z 0 , the KS Tester computes the value
The last k computations of p j it (from previous probes) are averaged to form the feature v j it . In practice, we found that k = 15 produces good results. If v j it ≈ 0, then the KS Tester randomly decides whether or not to update Z j with z 0 . In (15) , we take the maximum p-value, since this makes the feature more robust against false positives.
E. Host Profiler (HP)
The HP component uses autoencoders to perform the basic anomaly detection. First, we will explain in detail how an autoencoder works, and then we will explain how the HP uses them to detect anomalies in the link with host j . 1) Autoencoders: An autoencoder is an artificial neural network (ANN) which is trained to reconstruct it's inputs [28] . During training, an autoencoder tries to learn the function
where θ is the learned parameters of the ANN, and x ∈ R n is an instance (observation). It can be seen that an autoencoder is essentially trying to learn the identity function of the original data distribution. Therefore, constraints are placed on the network, forcing it to learn more meaningful concepts and relationships between the features in x. The most common constraint is to limit the number of neurons in the inner layers of the network. The narrow passage causes the network to learn compact encodings and decodings of the input instances. The structure of the autoencoder can be seen in Fig. 8 .
If an instance does not belong to the learned concepts, then we expect the reconstruction to have a high error. The reconstruction error can be computed by taking the root mean squared error (RMSE) between the input x and the reconstructed output y. The RMSE between two vectors is defined as
where n is the dimensionality of the input vectors.
In order to determine whether or not the observation x is an anomaly, we set a cut-off probability p thr , and test if p(X > r x, y ) < p thr assuming that X ∼ N(μ r , σ r ), where μ r and σ r are sample statistics taken from the benign instances' RMSEs.
2) The Anomaly Detection Procedure: To detect anomalies, the HP component maintains an autoencoder for each j ∈ (denoted A j ). The task of A j is to (1) learn the normal behavior of the system S i j via each probe v taken from host j , and (2) raise an alert if a sample v is abnormal. The HP accomplishes this in a plug-and-play fashion by continuously training A j on non-anomalous data, and by giving A j a grace period to converge before execution (e.g., only after training on 100 observations). In summary, the HP performs the following steps when instance v arrives:
F. Deployments
There are two ways one can deploy Vesper on a LAN. In order to protect the link between host i and j Vesper only needs to be running on host i . However, this trust is one-sided since j would be unaware of the state of his link with i . Therefore, to secure all links in a LAN in a fully trusted manner, all hosts in the LAN must be running an instance of Vesper. This kind of deployment can be practical in large LANs if Vesper (1) sends probes to all LAN end-hosts as usual during an initial training phase (e.g., one day), and then (2) have the OR only send probes to IP addresses with whom the local host is currently communicating with.
Another option is to install one instance of Vesper on the network gateway (router). Although this does not secure the links between each host of the LAN, it does secure the inbound and outbound traffic. We note that both deployments only protect a host from MitM attacks originating within the same LAN. In the future, we plan extending Vesper to work across routers as well.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we refer to the device on which Vesper is installed as Alice, and Bob as the device whose channel with Alice is under attack.
We evaluated Vesper in detecting End-Point Traffic Diversion (EP-TD), In-Line Network Bridge (IL-NB), In-Line Dedicated Hardware (IL-DH) and In-Point Dedicated Hardware (IP-DH) MitM attacks (see Table I ). For the EP-TD MitM attack, we used a Kali Linux Desktop PC which performed an ARP poising attack. For the IL-NB and IL-DH MitM attacks, we used a Raspberry Pi 3B and a 1Gbps Ethernet switch respectively. The Pi was provided with an extra Ethernet adapter, and configured to operate as a network bridge. For the IP-DH MitM attacks, we used three 1Gbps switches: an advanced feature (SW1), basic (SW2), and PoE (SW3) switch.
In this section, we refer to each of the devices in the above setups as the attacker Eve. In our experiments, we used a C++ implementation of Vesper, set the autoencoder learning rate to l = 0.1, the KS-Tester parameters to m = 5 and k = 15, and the MLS probe length to N = 1023. The T t x and T r x times were obtained with ±83 ns accuracy. 3 In order to evaluate Vesper's accuracy when operating in different sized LANs, we examined two setups: (1) when Alice connects to the same switch as Bob (one intermediary switch), and (2) when Alice connects several switches away from Bob (multiple intermediary switches). In both setups, Vesper was evaluated in the presence of a wide variety of real-world traffic, while the end-hosts were actively using the network. We will now present our experimental results accordingly (a summary of the experiments and results can be found in Table II) .
A. One Intermediary Switch
For the EP 4 and IL 5 MitMs, we experimented on two LANs (1) a surveillance camera network, and (2) a LAN segment populated with active servers. The surveillance network consisted 8 high-end HD Sony cameras and three PCs. The server LAN segment consisted of one large switch connected to 61 active servers (please see this paper's the supplementary material for statistics on the switch's load). Alice was a Kali Linux laptop PC (Intel i5 CPU), and Bob was either a camera (SNC-EB602R), a Windows desktop PC workstation (Intel i7 CPU), or a data server (Intel Xeon E5-2660 CPU) in each experiment. The desktop PC was located in the surveillance network.
We performed the EP-TD, 6 IL-NB, 7 and IL-DH 8 attacks on each of the three versions of Bob, with duration of 3 hours each. Fig. 13 shows RMSE scores produced by Vesper in each of experiments (at the moment of the attack). Each point in the figure represents the result of a single probe, and the color indicates the probe's abnormality.
For the IP-DH 9 attack, we trained Vesper on one switch, and then swapped the switch with a different one. Fig. 14 presents the results from the IP-DH attacks.
In all experiments, the IL-NB 7 was the easiest MitM attack to detect. This is because the Pi must perform additional logic in the kernel in order to bridge each ICMP packet. In contrast, the IL-DH 8 and IP-DH 9 were the most difficult to detect, because the packet interception was performed by dedicated hardware. We also note that there were 15 false positives in the experiment with the Server and the IL-DH due to a momentary disconnect. However, these FPs can be easily be mitigated by using an averaging window over the scores. This is because the mean of the scores' distribution significantly changes as seen in Fig. 13 . However, the trade-off with using averaging window is that it causes a detection delay. Here, we found that a window size of one minute reduces the number of false positives to zero. 9 In-Point Dedicated Hardware: Replacing a switch with an infected one
B. Multiple Intermediary Switches
To evaluate Vesper across multiple intermediary switches, we used an organization's office LAN. The LAN consisted of over 379 network hosts connected through 14 large Ethernet switches, some of which used optical fiber uplinks. The hosts consisted of workstations, servers, printers, and IoT devices. The test scenario involved Alice (a desktop PC), and Bob (the secretary's PC) which were located on opposite sides of the LAN (separated by four large switches). The probes were sent for three hours, and the attacks (Eve) were IL 5 MitMs only. Fig. 15 shows Vesper's RMSE scores during the day (busy hours) and during the night. The additional traffic during the day caused several false positives when detecting the IL-DH 8 . However, by using an averaging window of 10 seconds, we were able to mitigate the errors completely. The results show that Vesper can detect IL MitMs sufficiently well in large noisy LANs, especially during off-hours.
C. Long Term Evaluation
In the previous subsections, we examined Vesper's capability and robustness in detecting various MitM attacks over different network topologies. In order to evaluate Vesper's long-term performance, we ran Vesper for seven days over a network which was burdened with daily traffic (please see this paper's the supplementary material for details). In this scenario, Vesper monitored a surveillance camera over two intermediary switches. The first intermediary switch was a large 24 port switch connected to 17 active office PCs, and up-linked via fiber to a larger LAN (359 network hosts). The second intermediary switch was an eight-port PoE switch by D-Link which was connected to IP surveillance cameras. At the end of seven days, we performed an IL-NB 7 MitM attack and then an IL-DH 8 MitM attack. Fig., 19 shows that the fluctuating network traffic harmed the v j it feature, but overall, did not affect Vesper's MitM detection performance. We also note that v RT T * provided a slightly better detection of the attacks than v E h . However, an adversary can easily evade the detection of v RT T * by replaying timed packets or by simply performing an EP-TD 6 attack such as ARP poisoning. Furthermore, the impulse response feature v E h can differentiate between end-point devices and, in some cases, identical devices (see figures 10, 14, and 18) . Therefore, v E h is a stronger MitM indicator than v RT T * . In conclusion, the long term experiment shows that Vesper can be a practical longterm solution in a real-world network.
D. Profile Train Time
A concern with Vesper is that should a change occur in the LAN's topology, the affected models in the HP component must be retrained. When retrained during busy hours, in the event of an IL 5 MitM, we found that Vesper reaches a false positive rate of zero within seconds (5-15 probes) when applied over one switch, and approximately a minute when applied across multiple switches (the large office LAN). Therefore, although Vesper is vulnerable during training, the attacker is challenged with deploying the MitM attack within a narrow time window. To make this window even smaller, Vesper can send probes at a faster rate during the grace period. Fig. 17 shows Vesper's performance over time, in the case of multiple switches during day-time traffic. The performance was measured in AUC [30] , interpretation: (1.0) Vesper was a perfect detector, (0.5) Vesper was randomly guessing. Fig. 16 shows how the parameter N increases the separation between the normal probes and anomalous probes. Although the use of longer probes improves accuracy, there is a tradeoff with bandwidth. Vesper sends one probe per second, and a probe has an average of N( 42+1542 2 ) bytes. For example, with an N = 1023, the bandwidth used is approximately 810 Kbps. This rate is practical, especially since the probe traffic is contained within the LAN, and can be sent between hosts which are currently communicating (see section V-F). However, a user should consider the number of Vesper instances installed to appropriately configure N according to his/her limitations.
E. Probe Length

F. Digital Fingerprint
Vesper's probes capture a unique digital fingerprint of the target end-host, and the network devices along the way. Even identical devices have different fingerprints due to imperfections from the manufacturing process (e.g., clock skew [31] ). In Fig. 14, we showed that Vesper can detect when a switch is swapped with a different one due to the change in this fingerprint. In Fig. 18 , we show that Vesper can detect the change in fingerprint when a switch is replaced with an identical switch. Interestingly, on many switches, we were also able to detect when a port on the same switch is changed. This indicates that a networking device's fingerprint reflects the control module, and sometimes the electronic interfaces as well.
VII. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS Our base assumption in this paper is that Eve introduces her MitM attack after Vesper has been deployed. However, even with this assumption, Eve can still attempt to evade detection. In this section, we discuss possible tactics which Eve may perform to evade detection. We then discuss and demonstrate how Vesper can detect these adversarial attacks.
In general, there are four possible adversarial attacks against Vesper (illustrated in Fig. 20) : DoS, Spoof, Replay, and Bypass. Vesper can detect these evasions through the three features which the FE extracts from each probe. Each feature is strong at detecting some attacks but weak at detecting the others. However, when combined, the three features provide good protection against the attacks. Table III maps this relationship. The Table also provides a summary of each feature's strengths and weaknesses. We will now discuss the detection capabilities of each feature with respect to each evasion.
A. DoS
In a DoS attack against Vesper, Eve drops Echo_Request packets en route to Bob so that Alice never receives the signal y. All of the features are strong against this attack. This is because there is a large spike in the features' values when a signal is lost.
B. Spoof
In a spoof attack against Vesper, Eve replies to Echo_Request packets en route to Bob, on behalf of Bob. In this attack, no additional hops are added to the packet's route to Bob. However, if Eve is topologically close to Alice, then there may be fewer hops altogether.
The features are affected by a spoof attack as follows: v E h is modest at detecting a spoof attack in the case of an EP with the same topological distance as Alice↔Bob. This is because there is a possibility that two different impulses will have the same energy. However, when launched from an IL MitM, v E h is strong because the topological placement of the MitM highly affects v E h . v rtt * This feature is modest in detecting a spoof attack by an EP 10 MitM. This is because in the case where the link Alice↔Eve has the same topological distance as Alice↔Bob (e.g., same number of hops), v rtt * may not be affected. However, if Alice↔Eve has a greater topological distance, then v rtt * may increase. Finally, if Alice↔Eve has a smaller distance, then Eve may be advanced enough to delay the response so that the average timing fits the origination distance. Since the relationship is asymmetrical, if both Alice and Bob have an instance of Vesper, then Eve will be detected by one of them. With regards to the case of an IL 11 MitM, v rtt * is weak. This is because Eve cannot have a topological distance which greater than Alice↔Bob. v j it is strong in detecting a spoof attack. This is because the distribution of the probe's jitter captures of the end-host's processing behaviors -which is hard to spoof. We note that it is difficult to detect a spoof attack in the case where an EP MitM is used, and Eve has the same topological distance as Alice↔Bob. However, even if Eve's MitM device has the exact same hardware, firmware, and software as Bob's device, (1) Eve will only be able to perform a MitM attack on the link with Bob, but not Carol (who has a different device), and (2) there are minute differences in Bob's hardware which truly give Bob's device a unique fingerprint, thus making it difficult for Alice to spoof a reply from Bob.
As mentioned in section VI-F, identical switches and enddevices have unique 'fingerprints' from imperfections in their manufacturing processes [31] , [32] . Vesper captures the fingerprint of Bob in y. To demonstrate the attacker's challenge in building a MitM device which captures Bob's fingerprint, we had many different devices perform a spoof attack against each other. The experiment was setup in the following way: 10 End-Point: Such as the use of ARP poisoning 11 In-Line: Such as an added network bridge 1) A set of network hosts from the same LAN are selected, and Vesper is installed on a separate host (Alice). 2) Vesper (Alice) is trained to protect the link between the local host and host i ∈ (Bob). 3) After 2000 probes, host j ∈ (Eve) replies to Vesper instead of host i . 4) Vesper's detection performance id measured after 2000 more probes. 5) Steps 2-4 are repeated for every combination of i, j ∈ .
We denote the pair (i, j ) as spoof attack trial. The above experiment was performed on two different LANs:
as An assortment of 100 different networked computers and IoTs in a office LAN over multiple switches. This set of network hosts was used to see if a diverse set of devices have different signatures. In other words, if Eve uses any random device to perform her MitM attack, what would be the likelihood of her spoof evasion to succeed? For details on the devices used in this network, please see this paper's the supplementary material. pi A set of 46 identical Raspberry Pi 3B devices all connected to a single switch. This set of devices were used in order to determine how likely Eve will succeed at her spoof attack if she replicates Bob's device (and places it at the same topological distance as Alice↔Bob). This experiment also demonstrates how unique the fingerprints are between a large set of identical devices. The results for the experiment on as and pi are summarized in figures 23 and 24. The performance is measured in AUC, where the value has the following interpretation: (1.0) Vesper was a perfect detector, (0.5) Vesper couldn't differentiate between hosts i and j , and (0.0) Vesper thought that host j was host i . The results show that Vesper is robust against spoof evasion attacks in all cases. The results on as show us that there is an extremely low likelihood that the attacker's MitM device will be able to spoof the victim's device (or successfully perform an IL 12 MitM attack if she uses just any hardware. The results on pi show that Vesper can distinguish between 70% of the identical devices after 10 minutes. Therefore, even if the attacker manages to use the exact same hardware/software as the victim, Vesper is still likely to detect the change. Furthermore, Eve will only be able to spoof devices which she has copied (e.g., other Rasp. Pis).
C. Replay
In a replay attack against Vesper, Eve replays a previously intercepted response signal y back to Alice, whenever a probe x is intercepted on its way to Bob.
The features are affected by a replay attack as follows: v E h is strong in detecting all replay attacks. This is because the feature is dependent on the MLS signal, and the MLS sequence is difficult to predict in real-time. 13 We also note that the duration of a signal x is not a constant and can be very noisy due to Alice's host's scheduler. This strengthens the detection capabilities of v E h in the case of a replay attack because the noise adds a non-deterministic skew to the tx times -which Eve cannot predetermine. v rtt * This feature is also dependent on the MLS signal. This is because the average RTT is computed on the packets with a size of 1546 only (and not 46). Since the replayed signal will have a different modulation, v rtt * will be lower than it should. However, if Alice uses dedicated networking hardware, she may unintentionally mitigate the noise skew added to the tx times. Therefore, we consider v rtt * modest at detecting replay attacks. v j it This feature is very weak in detecting replay attacks. This is because v j it is not dependent on the uniqueness of the MLS signal, and thus can be easily copied. In Fig. 22 , we present the affect which a replay attack has on each of the features (top), and Vesper's final anomaly score (bottom). The figure shows that although v j it fails at detecting the attack and that v rtt * is modestly affected, the final score clearly detects Eve's replay evasion due to the combination of v rtt * and v E h .
D. Bypass
In a bypass attack against Vesper, an advanced attacker uses a special IL 12 device which can choose to either (1) interact with the network acting as a MitM (active-mode), or (2) passively observe traffic acting as a wiretap (passive-mode). To evade detection, Eve is either (A) always in active-mode and switches to passive-mode when an ICMP request is received, OR (B) always in passive-mode and switches to active-mode only when Eve wants to manipulate or inject traffic. Vesper can only detect Eve while she is in active-mode.
Vesper can detect Eve if she uses (A). This is because, by the time the first ICMP packet in x is detected by Eve, the frame has already been partially buffered. Therefore, Eve must pass x [1] through her regular interception process before switching over to passive-mode (see Fig. 21 for results). Furthermore, if Eve uses (B), then it is likely that Vesper will detect her. This is because Eve must remain in activemode for long durations in order to be effective. For example, to manipulate streaming/live data, maintain a compromised TCP connection, or to intercept a choice packet.
Another attack may be to learn h in passive-mode, and then apply h to observed probed in active-mode in a spoof attack. However, it is not likely that Eve will be able to learn h from her topological location in the network. This is because, Eve observes the ICMP request packets after they have traversed some portion of the network (switches, cable, . . .), and ICMP reply packets before they traverse the other portion of the network and Alice's networking stack. Furthermore, Eve will likely leave her fingerprint on the probe when she spoofs it back to Alice (see Fig. 23 ).
VIII. CONCLUSION
As of today, MitM attacks still pose a great threat to many LANs. In this paper we have presented a new technique for detecting MitM attacks in LANs via ping echo analysis. We have shown how the technique can be practically applied via a MitM detection framework called Vesper. Experimental results show that (1) Vesper is capable of detecting endpoint, in-line, and in-point MitM attacks, and (2) is robust against possible adversarial attacks. For future work, we plan on applying other ping methods (e.g., TCP SYN), applying noise mitigation techniques, and extending the technique to work over routers, and applying Vesper to Wi-Fi networks.
In general, MitM attacks should be prevented by using secure protocols between machines, even in a trusted environment. However, we note that Vesper provides an extra line of defense, and can additionally alert the user of an attacker's presence.
